North Dakota Law Review
Volume 89

Number 3

Article 2

1-1-2013

The State of Democracy in North Dakota
David Schultz

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Schultz, David (2013) "The State of Democracy in North Dakota," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 89 : No. 3
, Article 2.
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol89/iss3/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For
more information, please contact zeineb.yousif@library.und.edu.

THE STATE OF DEMOCRACY IN NORTH DAKOTA
DAVID SCHULTZ

ABSTRACT
This article provides a brief assessment of the state of democracy in
North Dakota, using it as a case study to make some broader claims about
politics in America. The overall thesis is that while North Dakota has some
attributes that lend itself to promoting its image as populist, the reality is
that democracy is far from secure in the Peace Garden State. Instead, the
largely unregulated, free-for-all political environment has yielded a state
where its outputs have produced a political process that is often corrupt, or
at least malfunctions, in serious ways. Thus, North Dakota is emblematic
of some larger trends in American politics. In order to make this claim, this
article will do several things.
First, the article will offer a brief introduction to the political history
and structure of North Dakota politics. The goal will then eventually be to
focus on two major facets of North Dakota politics—its use of initiative and
referendum and its failure to regulate the use of money in politics. Second,
both of these features of North Dakota politics will be examined to reveal
how they have damaged the state’s political system and how such damage
is a microcosm of broader problems with ballot initiatives and unregulated
money in politics.
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INTRODUCTION

North Dakota is a political enigma. It is home to direct democracy
through initiative and referendum, but it is also a state ranked with a failing
grade in political accountability and integrity.1 It has used ballot initiatives
to further many government reforms, but it has a record of targeting
individual rights. It is a state with unique “socialist” institutions, such as
the nation’s only state-owned bank2 and mill,3 yet it is also a state gripped
with free market frontier frenzy on the Bakken reserve when it comes to
regulating the hydraulic fracturing technology and practices implemented to
1. See State Integrity Investigation, CTR. FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY (Dec. 23, 2013),
http://www.publicintegrity.org/2012/03/19/8423/grading-nation-how-accountable-your-state.
2. In 1919, the North Dakota state legislature established the Bank of North Dakota (the
“Bank”) to establish state ownership of the various marketing and credit agencies, and to protect
local farmers from the predatory lenders and financing. The Bank was created in an effort to
promote agriculture, commerce and industry throughout the state and is, now, an institution
claiming more than $270 million in capital. Moreover, the Bank became the first financial
institution to issue federally insured student loans in 1967. See Bank of N.D., BANK OF NORTH
DAKOTA, available at http://banknd nd.gov/about_BND/history_of_BND html (last visited Apr.
21, 2014).
3. The North Dakota Mill and Elevator Association began operating October 22, 1922 as a
value-added market for wheat produced in North Dakota, which now adds value to twenty three
million bushels of North Dakota spring and durum wheat annually by selling wheat products to
various bakery, pasta customers, and food service suppliers—providing the state with an annual
payroll of s$7 million.
History, NORTH DAKOTA MILL, available at
https://www ndmill.com/history.cfm (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
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extract oil and natural gas from one of the nation’s largest oil basins.4 It is
the only state in the country that does not require citizens to register to vote,
yielding one of the highest voter turnout rates in the country, but it also
largely does not regulate political spending. Consequentially, it is hard to
label North Dakota as either a sterling example of democracy or a
representation of what ails much of contemporary American democracy.
Two events best capture the enigma of North Dakota politics. First is
the legislative resolution in 2013 that will send to the voters a constitutional
amendment defining personhood, effectively aimed at ending abortion and
reproductive rights of women. Should it be adopted, it will, on one hand,
represent democracy in action—the people acting on their own to legislate.
However, should it pass, it will also represent the use of majority rule to
infringe upon individual rights. Conversely, the right of individuals and
most entities to make unlimited political contributions is either expression
of a real marketplace of political ideas or it is a sign of the power of money
to corrupt politics.
This article provides a brief assessment of the state of democracy in
North Dakota, using it as a case study to make some broader claims about
politics in America. The overall thesis is that while North Dakota has some
attributes that lend itself to promoting its image as populist, the reality is
that democracy is far from secure in the Peace Garden State. Instead, the
largely unregulated, free-for-all political environment has yielded a state
where its outputs have produced a political process that is often corrupt, or
at least malfunctions, in serious ways. Thus, North Dakota is emblematic
of some larger trends in American politics. In order to make this claim, this
article will do several things.
First, the article will offer a brief introduction to the political history
and structure of North Dakota politics. The goal will then eventually be to
focus on two major facets of North Dakota politics—its use of initiative and
referendum and its failure to regulate the use of money in politics. Second,
both of these features of North Dakota politics will be examined to reveal
how they have damaged the state’s political system and how such damage
is a microcosm of broader problems with ballot initiatives and unregulated
money in politics.

4. According to various studies, it is estimated that the Bakken formation could contain as
much as 503 billion barrels of original oil in place (“OOP”)—placing the Bakken formation as one
of the largest oil basins in the world. See Leonardo Maugeri, Oil: The Next Revolution, BELFER
CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, June 2012, at 47.
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II. BRIEF HISTORY OF NORTH DAKOTA POLITICS AND
POLITICAL REGULATION
David B. Danborn describes North Dakota as a state full of aspirations
that were never realized.5 Instead the state has constantly been gripped by a
sense of inferiority or a colonial status: “dominated economically, socially,
culturally, and politically by outsiders.”6 It is also a state often seen as an
outsider, isolated by weather and geography from the rest of the Midwest.7
The importance of this description is that this sense of isolation and being
an outsider has meant that the people of North Dakota generally pull
together and are “tolerant and sensitive to one another;” they remain
contemptuous of outsiders, including that of its own Native-American
population.8 But this sense of community born of its isolation has
politically meant that North Dakota often looks nonpartisan and nonideological,9 especially after the early experiences of farmer populism,
progressivism, and perhaps, socialism and the Non-Partisan League were
extinguished from the state, leaving it to this day with a culture largely
conservative.10 North Dakota politics also are characterized by its sense of
community tied to family and church, and by a commitment to “civil pride
and sense of civic responsibility.”11 As a result, one can describe
contemporary North Dakota politics as both a mixture of libertarianism and
communitarianism, strongly conservative, but with vestiges of populism
that still reside within the state.
North Dakota’s political history and culture have produced a unique
regulatory framework when it comes to its government and campaigns and
elections. In many ways the regulatory framework is libertarian, displaying
little effort to control or regulate campaigns and elections or the political
process in general. For example, North Dakota is the only state in the
country that does not require its citizens to register to vote;12 they merely
5. David B. Danborn, North Dakota: The Most Midwestern State, in HEARTLAND:
COMPARATIVE HISTORIES OF MIDWESTERN STATES 107 (James H. Madison ed., 1990).
6. Id. at 109.
7. Id. at 110, 118. See also Thomas W. Howard, Preface, to THOMAS W. HOWARD, THE
NORTH DAKOTA POLITICAL TRADITION, vii, viii (1981), for a similar description.
8. Danborn, supra note 5, at 111.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 113-14. See also Larry Remele, Power to the People: The Nonpartisan League, in
THE NORTH DAKOTA POLITICAL TRADITION 66 (Thomas W. Howard ed., 1981) for a discussion
of the Nonpartisan League and the early radicalism of North Dakota politics including during the
Progressive Era; D. Jerome Tweton, The Anti-League Movement: The IVA, in THE NORTH
DAKOTA POLITICAL TRADITION 93 (Thomas W. Howard ed.,1981) documents the conservative
legacy remaining after the purging in the 1920s and 1930s the Nonpartisan League from the state.
11. Danborn, supra note 5, at 122-23.
12. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-01-04 (2009).
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need to be residents of the state, with the rules of residency prescribed by
law that make it difficult to lose voter eligibility.13 In 2012, this yielded a
voter turnout of 60.5% in the presidential election;14 a respectable turnout
above the national state average of 58.2% but below the national leader
Minnesota with a 75.7% turnout.15 As of August 1, 2013, North Dakota
now requires voters to present identification before casting a ballot, unless
the poll worker can vouch for the voter’s identity and address.16 How such
a law will eventually affect the voter turnout in the state is yet to be seen,
but it does demonstrate that North Dakota politics is engrossed by fears of
voter fraud that are seen across the country.17
Second, North Dakota largely does very little to regulate political
expenditures and contributions. In 1981, North Dakota adopted a new
election code modeled, in many ways, on federal law. But that law, for the
most part, was not debated or even challenged in court, leaving it with a
parse history regarding what its key provisions meant.18 Limits on political
expenditures are largely unconstitutional, so it is not a surprise that they are
permitted in North Dakota. In fact, North Dakota, like many states, bans
direct corporate contributions to candidates.19 But long before Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission, corporate contributions were
permitted in North Dakota so long as they were done through a separate
segregated fund under control of the corporation.20 There is no public
financing for any elections in North Dakota. In addition, there are no
contribution limits of any kind in the state, at least since the 1995 revisions
of the North Dakota Century Code (“Century Code”). Moreover, the
Century Code contains no statutory provisions with respect to the
organization and formation of a PAC. In effect, except for direct corporate
contributions to candidates, almost anyone or any entity can make unlimited
political contributions to any state candidates in North Dakota. In light of
Citizens United, it is also questionable regarding whether any restrictions on

13. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-01-26 (2008). In effect, this statute requires one to
intentionally renounce residency, and it is not lost automatically as a result of marriage or as stated
in N.D. CENT. CODE §16.1-01-04, by relocation or attendance at school.
14. Michael
McDonald,
2012
General
Election
Turnout
Rates,
http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2012G html (last visited May 30, 2014).
15. Id.
16. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-05-07 (2009).
17. See generally LORRAINE C. MINNITE, THE MYTH OF VOTER FRAUD (2010).
18. Bruce A. Schoenwald, A Conundrum in a Quagmire: Unraveling North Dakota’s
Campaign Finance Law, 82 N.D. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006).
19. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(1) (2013).
20. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03.3(2). See also Schoenwald, supra note 18, at 1, 4.
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expenditures from corporate treasuries—and the requirement that they come
from separate segregated funds—are constitutional.21
The largely laissez-faire regulatory environment towards politics
extends to disclosure and regulation of lobbying and lobbyists. In terms of
political contributions, there is no requirement to disclose unless the
contributions exceed $200 in the aggregate during a reporting period.22 For
lobbyists, the state largely does not regulate them or provide the public with
much information regarding their activity.23 The laws regarding lobbying
were adopted in 1975 and have not been changed much since then, despite
the growth of the number of lobbyists in the state,24 and the trend
nationwide toward more lobbyist restrictions.25 In North Dakota, the laws
regarding when lobbyists are required to register, or the restrictions on them
giving gifts to legislators, are also lax.26 In fact, lobbyists only need to
disclose expenditures of sixty dollars or more per legislator,27 amounts
higher than neighboring Minnesota.28 Additionally, if a lobbyist offers a
gift to a legislator, he needs to give her the opportunity to purchase it. 29
This is hardly much of a restriction, especially compared to the restrictions
many other states place on such behavior.30 When it comes to prosecution
or enforcement of election law violations, North Dakota’s laws are largely
ineffective.31 This is true for several reasons. First, the laws are enforced
by partisan officials who are subject to political pressures and influences—
especially with respect to prosecuting these election law violations.32
Second, because there are no provisions for advisory opinions, parties are
left often times in the dark regarding what the law requires.33 Third, North

21. Nathan R. Martindale, Comment, Citizens Divided: Balancing the First Amendment
Right to Free Speech and the Role of Private Corporations in Our Nation’s Elections, 86 N.D. L.
REV. 619, 632 (2010).
22. This period is usually calendar year. See, e.g., N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-08.1-03 (2013).
23. Levi D. Andrist & Joel Gilbertson, Lawyering and Lobbying: the Discipline of Public
Policy Advocacy, 87 N.D. L. REV. 59, 61 (2011).
24. Id. at 62.
25. See generally Jessica A. Levinson, Timing Is Everything: A New Model for Countering
Corruption Without Silencing Speech in Elections, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 853 (2011).
26. Andrist & Gilbertson, supra note 23, at 63-64.
27. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-05.1-03(2) (2013).
28. Andrist & Gilbertson, supra note 23, at 69-70.
29. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-05.1-05(1)(2) (2013).
30. See Ethics: Legislator Gift Restrictions Overview, NAT’L COUNCIL OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, http://www ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-table-gift-laws.aspx (last visited on
Dec. 3, 2013).
31. See generally Allen Dickerson & Zac Morgan, Campaign Finance Advisory Opinions at
the State Level, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 773 (2012).
32. Id. at 785.
33. Id. at 784.
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Dakota does little to audit campaign finance reports.34 As a result, few
enforcement actions for violations are ever brought.35
What is the result of this largely unregulated environment? While
North Dakota may come out on top in some surveys for financial
management,36 it certainly ranks low when it comes to political
management. For example, North Dakota has one of the highest per capita
state conviction rates for corruption.37 Additionally, a survey jointly
undertaken by Center of Public Integrity and several other groups awarded
North Dakota an “F” on its Corruption Risk Report Card, placing it fortythird in the nation.38 The State received failing grades for political
financing, legislative accountability, lobbyist disclosure, and ethics
enforcement.39
North Dakota politics are largely driven by consensus—at least
consensus among business and political elites operating in close proximity
to one another. For example, the Consensus Council is “a private, nonprofit
corporation which was founded in 1990 by a partnership of North Dakota’s
private and public leaders.”40 While noble in theory, such a council gives
business leaders unique access to policy makers, allowing them
opportunities for special influence and the ability to help define and set the
legislative agenda. In addition, the Center for Responsive Politics notes
how several industries in North Dakota, such as agriculture and energy, are
major political contributors in the state.41 While this data is for federal
elections, the presumption is that state elections are equally dominated by
industry money. However, no study on the relationship between money and
politics has been done in North Dakota, partially because the lax disclosure
laws would make such a study difficult. One is thus left with conjecture on
this topic.

34. Todd Lochner, Surveying the Landscape of State Campaign Finance Enforcement: A
Preliminary Analysis, 4 ELECTION L.J. 329, 338 (2005).
35. Id. at 345.
36. The Best and Worst Run States In America: A Survey of All Fifty, 24/7 WALL ST,
http://247wallst.com/investing/2010/10/04/the-best-and-worst-run-states-in-america-a-survey-ofall-fifty/ (last visited on Nov. 17, 2013).
37. See generally Anthony J. Gaughan, The Futility of Contribution Limits in the Age of
Super Pacs, 60 DRAKE L. REV. 755 (2012) (noting how North Dakota ranks in the top ten of states
for convicted officials per capita).
38. State
Integrity,
N.D.
Corruption
Risk
Report
Card,
http://www.stateintegrity.org/north_dakota (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
39. Id.
40. Bruce T. Levi & Larry Spears, Public Policy Consensus Building: Connecting to Change
for Capturing the Future, 70 N.D. L. REV. 311, 315 (1994).
41. North Dakota Leading Industries,
CTR. FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS,
http://www.opensecrets.org/states/indus.php?cycle=2012&state=ND (last visited Nov. 17, 2013).
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Finally, the largely hands off regulatory environment is joined by the
state’s use of initiative and referendum. North Dakota adopted initiative
and referendum in 1914.42 According to the Secretary of State, from 1889
until 2010 there have been a total of 486 measures placed on the ballot for
voters to consider. These include matters referred to the people by the
legislature or Constitutional Convention (233). There have also been 45
citizen-initiated constitutional measures and 134 statutory measures.43
From 1918, when the first instances of initiative or referendum were placed
before voters, through 1998, there were a total of 166 ballot propositions, of
which forty-five percent have passed.44
However, while the use of initiative and referendum has perhaps
produced some good results, it has also been used to target individual
rights. A 1972 pro-choice law allowing for physicians to terminate some
pregnancies failed. In 2004, an anti-gay marriage constitutional initiative
was adopted by voters. In 2000, a constitutional initiative was adopted by
voters declaring “[h]unting, trapping, and fishing and the taking of game
and fish are a valued part of our heritage and will be preserved for the
people and managed by law and regulation for the public good.”45 This
type of legislation, also adopted in states such as Minnesota, is less about
the right to hunt and fish and were often adopted in reaction to NativeAmerican Indian treaty rights.46 In November, 2014, there will be a
“personhood” amendment on the ballot declaring “[t]he inalienable right to
life of every human being at any stage of development must be recognized
and protected.”47 Personhood amendments generally are aimed at limiting
abortion rights.48 The new state requirement mandating identification to
vote49 also targets individual and perhaps minority rights.50 Thus, while in

42. SEC’Y OF STATE, N.D. BLUEBOOK 504 (2011-2013).
43. Id. at 508.
44. North Dakota Statewide Initiative Usage, INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM INST., available

at
http://www.iandrinstitute.org/New%20IRI%20Website%20Info/I&R%20Research%20and%20Hi
story/I&R%20at%20the%20Statewide%20Level/Usage%20history/North%20Dakota.pdf
(last
visited on Dec. 2, 2013).
45. N.D. CONST. art. XI, § 27.
46. Mary Jane Morrison, Amending the Minnesota Constitution in Context: The Two
Proposals in 2012, 34 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 115, 137 (2013).
47. Measures on the November 4, 2014 Ballot, N.D. SEC’Y OF STATE, available at
https://vip.sos nd.gov/PortalListDetails.aspx?ptlhPKID=4&ptlPKID=1#content-start (last visited
on Dec. 2, 2013).
48. Mark Strasser, The Next Battleground? Personhood, Privacy, and Assisted Reproductive
Technologies, 65 OK L.REV. 177, 177-78 (2013).
49. N.D. CENT. CODE § 16.1-05-07 (2009).
50. See generally David Schultz, Less than Fundamental: The Myth of Voter Fraud and the
Coming of the Second Great Disenfranchisement, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 484 (2008).
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general less than half of all ballot measures pass in North Dakota, those
targeting rights seem to have nearly a one hundred percent passage rate.
This prairie populism and letting voters legislate with minimal
regulation is yet another sign of the largely deregulatory approach to state
politics. In effect, along minimal regulation of the election and lobbying
process, North Dakota places little regulation on the people directly on
voting on legislation. Thus, one can summarize the state of North Dakota
democracy as essentially unregulated and wide open. It is the land of
limited regulation of money in politics, lobbying, disclosure, and the power
of the people to self-legislate. Is this democracy at its finest? Not
necessarily. The wide-open use of ballot initiatives and the unregulated use
of money in politics in North Dakota are emblematic of two of the worst
features of American politics.
III. DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND BALLOT INITIATIVES
North Dakota adopted initiative and referendum in 1914. It did so
during the Progressive Era of politics encompassing a period of American
history from the end of Reconstruction to the end of World War I. 51 The
era was marked by several characteristics, including a significant growth of
corporate influence and power as well as by the concentration of wealth in
the United States.52 For some, this concentration of wealth lead to concerns
among many that the ideals, and perhaps reality of American democracy,
were in danger of being lost.53
The threat to American democracy was especially manifested in how
this concentration in wealth and power was a corrupting influence, affecting
the purity and morality of its political institutions.54 Thus, the capacity of
legislatures across the country to act and represent the people was
threatened because of the plutocratic control and domination of them by big
business.55 It was out of a fear that the entrenched power of special
interests, such as business interests, had infected politics and resulted in the
incapacity of legislatures to act to serve the majority that Progressive
politics was born.56
Progressive politics held government and big business in contempt,
seeing them as teaming together to be the enemy of the people.57
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

See generally ROBERT H. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER: 1877-1920 (1967).
Id. at 13.
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. 5-6 (1955).
Id.
Id. at 238.
Id. at 257.
Id.; see also WIEBE, supra note 51, at 5.
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Progressives sought to restructure American political institutions58 and to
wrestle power back to serve the people.59 The solution to doing this resided
in initiative, referendum, and recall.60 William Munro of the National
Municipal League, one of the prime supporters of these three reforms,
described the Progressive animus behind these reforms as lying in public
loss of hope in the ability of legislators to act:
But a large section of the electorate has come to the conclusion
that these channels do not afford adequate facilities for the
assertion of popular sovereignty. [I]t can scarcely be urged that the
old machinery of democracy is fulfilling its professed ends to the
satisfaction of all. Popular distrust of the present system of lawmaking is undeniably widespread and deep. But it is not based on
the idea that the representatives of the people are incompetent to
do their duty. Rather it arises from the notion that they are
prevented from doing it. And these preventing influences, in the
popular mind, are various organized interests–political machines
and economic corporations–whose wishes do not usually run
parallel those of the electorate.61
According to Munro, the existing channels of legislation do not
represent the “majority of the electorate;”62 initiative and referendum will
be a form of direct democracy, allowing the people to bypass legislators and
special interests.63 Similarly, Teddy Roosevelt contended in the same
volume that initiative and referendum are “devices for giving better and
more immediate effect to the popular will.”64 Additionally, then governor
and soon to be President Woodrow Wilson also wrote in that volume that
Progressive politics was rooted in the need to address the concentrations of
wealth damaging American political institutions,65 and that initiative and
referendum were tools to restore representative government for the
people.66 Moreover, Progressives saw in direct democracy tools to educate
voters.67

58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

WIEBE, supra note 54, at 181.
HOFSTADTER, supra note 53, at 257-59.
Id. at 261.
WILLIAM BENNETT MUNRO, THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM, AND RECALL 16-17 (1913).
Id. at 20.
Id.
Roosevelt, Nationalism and Popular Will, in MUNRO, supra note 61, at 52, 64.
Id. at 69, 85.
Id. at 87.
MUNRO, supra note 61, at 21, 24.
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Thus, the goal of initiative and referendum was to restore American
representative democracy. It would do that by placing legislative power in
the hands of the people, granting to majorities the powers to make the laws
for themselves as a way of circumventing the corruption alliance of
concentrated wealth and elected officials. In juxtaposition to Madisonian
democracy, which sought to limit the threat of majority faction by creating
a complex political machinery with representative government,
Progressives placed faith in direct democracy as a way to bypass the evils
of representative government and restore power to the majority.
A. THE PROGRESSIVE SOLUTION: THE THREAT TO MINORITY RIGHTS
In some cases, initiative and referendum might be legitimate
expressions of majority rule. In many cases, it is not. Depending on one’s
political views, direct democracy has produced many important recent
reforms including medical marijuana and the decriminalization of that
drug,68 physician-assisted suicide,69 and important or political reform
initiatives.70 Progressive Era politics may be noble in its goals to break the
entrenched corruption and state politics at the close of the nineteenth and
rise of the twentieth century by seeking a direct majority appeal to the
people. Yet, Progressives forgot or ignored the essential insights of the
constitutional framers who saw in majoritarianism a threat to minority and
individual rights.
1. Minority Rights Generally Lose
Generally, minority rights lose in ballot initiatives. This is the case in
North Dakota with several recent or proposed amendments having targeted
reproductive rights, voting rights, or gay-lesbian rights. Ballot initiatives
still target minority rights, despite the fact that in the 2012 elections, samesex marriage was voted into law in Maine, Maryland, and Washington.
Moreover, an effort in Minnesota to constitutionally prohibit same-sex
marriage was also rejected by the voters in the same year. These four
victories for supporters of gay rights come after thirty-one states had

68. California Proposition 215 in 1996 added § 11362.5 to the Cal. Health & Safety Code
legalizing the use of marijuana for medical purposes.
69. Measure 16 of 1994 established Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act. OR. REV. STAT. §§
127.800-.995 (1995).
70. For example, in 1974 California voters enacted Proposition 9, enacting the Political
Reform Act and creating the Fair Political Practices Commission.
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already limited, via ballot initiatives, the rights of same-sex couples to
marry.71
Derrick Bell argues that while ballot initiatives for whites may be an
expression of democracy at its finest, for the poor and people of color
referenda can be perceived as a threat to their rights.72 Use of initiative and
referenda, while often seemingly neutral on their face, discriminate against
specific groups.70 Bell contends that while the judiciary will police direct
democracy when the balance between majority rule and minority rights has
been tipped too much against the latter, he asserts that the judiciary has
generally not taken an aggressive enough action to look beyond apparent
neutral processes to guard against abuses.73 Bell’s conclusion is that the
initiative and referendum process is structurally biased against minority
rights, and therefore, should be eliminated in light of the warnings of
majoritarian tyranny that James Madison cautioned.74
Thomas Cronin notes in Direct Democracy: The Politics of Initiative,
Referendum, and Recall that minority rights are often targets of initiatives
and referenda.75 While it is no doubt the case that some ballot measures
have supported minority rights, the truth is that more often than not ballot
measures have become another measure for special interest groups to push
their agenda—often at the expense of individual rights. For Cronin, it is
unlikely that debates on the rights of unpopular or minority groups, or other
politically salient issues, can be adequately undertaken in a media campaign
where dollars buy sound bites.76 Deliberation of public policy, however,
requires more than that.
Numerous studies examining ballot initiatives have documented their
hostility to minority rights.77 David B. Magleby reviewed ballot measures
between 1898 and 1978 and found that only 33% of them were supported
71. Nicole Neroulias, Gay Marriage Foes to Fight Expected Washington State Law,
REUTERS (Feb. 2, 2012, 11:07 PM), available at http://www reuters.com/article/2012/02/03/usgay-marriage-washington-idUSTRE81204O20120203.
72. See generally Derrick A. Bell, Jr., The Referendum: Democracy’s Barrier to Racial
Equality, 54 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1978-1979).
73. Id. at 7-9 (criticizing the approach the Court took in Eastlake v. Forest City Enterprises,
Inc., 426 U.S. 668 (1976), and James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137 (1971), where it respectively
upheld laws requiring public approach for zoning changes to build a high rise apartment building
and before a state public body could create a federally financed public housing project).
74. Id. at 28-29.
75. THOMAS CRONIN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: THE POLITICS OF INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM,
AND RECALL 90-99 (1999).
76. Id. at 116-23.
77. David B. Magleby, Let the Voters Decide? An Assessment of the Initiative and
Referendum Process, 66 U. COLO. L. REV. 13, 26-27 (1995). See also DANIEL C. LEWIS, DIRECT
DEMOCRACY AND MINORITY RIGHTS: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE TYRANNY OF THE
MAJORITY IN THE AMERICAN STATES (2012).
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by the voters.78 Magleby does not, however, indicate what percentage of
ballot measures targeting minority rights are successful. Instead, one of the
most comprehensive studies regarding the hostility of direct democracy to
minority rights was undertaken by Barbara Gamble.79 Gamble examined
local and state ballot measures related to AIDS testing, gay rights,
language, school desegregation, and housing/public accommodations
desegregation from 1960 to 1993. She found that 78% of the seventy-four
civil rights measures in her study defeated minority interests.80
Additionally, Sylvia Vargas updated and corroborated the Gamble
study, examining ballot initiatives from 1960 to 1998.81 According to
Vargas, “In the eighty-two initiatives and referendums surveyed in this
Article, majorities voted to repeal, limit, or prevent any minority gains in
their civil rights over 80% of the time.”82 Conversely, in efforts to extend
civil rights protections, the success rate was barely one in six.83
Gays, lesbians, and other minority groups generally lose in ballot
initiatives.84 For example, in 1977, St Paul, Minnesota adopted anti-gay
discrimination legislation, only to see voters repeal it in a 1978 ballot
initiative.85 In addition to the thirty-one state initiatives since 2004 that
have successfully targeted gay rights, Donald P. Haider-Markel and
Kenneth J. Meier looked at the passage rights of ballot initiatives seeking to
limit or extend rights to gays and lesbians.86 They found that 77% of the
time efforts to repeal the rights of gays and lesbians were successful
whereas only 16% of the efforts to extend rights were adopted.87 This antigay hostility did not stop after 1996 when the Supreme Court ruled in
Romer v. Evans that a Colorado ballot initiative rescinding local gay rights
laws was unconstitutional because the law singled out a specific group and

78. Magleby, supra note 77, at 26-27.
79. Barbara S. Gamble, Putting Civil Rights to a Popular Vote, 41 AM. J. POL. SCI. 245, 246
(1997).
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Sylvia R. Lazos Vargas, Judicial Review of Initiatives and Referenda in Which
Majorities Vote on Minorities’ Democratic Citizenship, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 399, 425 (1999).
83. Id.
84. See generally AMY L. STONE, GAY RIGHTS AT THE BALLOT BOX (2012) (arguing that in
general anti-gay interests have been successful in using initiative and referendum to the detriment
of gay rights); CRONIN, supra note 75, at 94-95.
85. CRONIN, supra note 75, at 95.
86. Donald P. Haider-Markel & Kenneth J. Meier, Legislative Victory, Electoral
Uncertainty: Explaining Outcomes in the Battles Over Lesbian and Gay Civil Rights (unpublished
manuscript) (presented at the 1995 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association).
87. Id. at 682-85.
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imposed upon them a “broad and undifferentiated disability on a single
named group.”88
Overall, minority rights are held hostage to ballot initiatives, and they
should not be. In Reitman v. Mulkey,82 the Supreme Court invalidated a
California ballot initiative that sought to repeal recently adopted legislation
aimed at addressing racial discrimination in the real estate market. The
Court ruled that the ballot measure had an “ultimate effect” in furthering
state discrimination, thereby violating the Equal Protection clause.89 Ballot
initiatives may be letting the people decide, but the people have no right to
commandeer the government to discriminate.
2. Money Spent for Initiatives and Referenda Cannot be Limited
In its 1978 decision First National Bank v. Bellotti,90 the United State
Supreme Court declared that money on ballot initiatives was core political
speech. Bellotti, along with other decisions such as Federal Elections
Commission v. Massachusetts Citizens Concerned for Life,91 Federal
Election Commission v. National Right to Work Committee,92 California
Medical Association v. Federal Election Commission,93 and Federal
Election Commission v. National Conservative Political Action
Committee,94 collectively stand for the proposition that limits on the amount
of money spent or contributed to support ballot initiatives were
unconstitutional. More importantly, the Court stated in Bellotti that limits
on corporate spending for issue advocacy violated the First Amendment.95
The importance of Bellotti for ballot initiatives is that when the people
get to vote, the state cannot limit the amount of money spent by any party,
including corporations. Hence, use of initiative and referendum opens an
enormous hole in our existing campaign finance laws, permitting
corporations and any other parties to spend unlimited amounts of money to
influence the outcome. The result is less a ballot proposition being a
statement about populism and direct democracy and more one potentially

88. 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996). See also William E. Adams, Jr., Can We Relax Now? An
Essay About Ballot Measures & Lesbian, Gay, and Bisexual Rights After Romer v. Evans, 2
NAT’L J. SEXUAL ORIENTATION L. 188, 190 (1996).
82
387 U.S. 369 (1967).
89. Id. at 373.
90. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
91. 479 U.S. 238 (1986).
92. 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
93. 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
94. 470 U.S. 480 (1985).
95. 435 U.S. at 784.
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about the ability to use resources and interests to push a favored corporate
agenda.
3. Money Spent On Initiatives and Referenda Circumvent
Populism
Thomas Cronin indicates in his book, Direct Democracy, that money
has a decisive influence on the outcome of ballot measures. For example,
he notes that corporate-backed sponsors win 80% of the ballot initiatives
and that when big money opposes a poorly funded ballot measure, “the
evidence suggests that the wealthier side has about a seventy-five percent or
better chance of defeating it.”96 In addition, evidence demonstrates strong
correlations between the amount of money spent and the number of votes
cast, and that while money cannot guarantee victory, the amount of money
spent is decisive in defeating a ballot proposition.97
Overall, the evidence suggests that a popular ballot measure is more
often than not defeated by corporate and special interest money. University
of Michigan Public Policy Professor Elisabeth R. Gerber reaches a similar
conclusion that the role of money is that of defeating, but not passing, ballot
measures.98 Thus, she sees ballot initiatives both as targeting minority
rights99 while at the same time undermining majoritarian preferences
because of the ability of wealthy individuals to use money to thwart popular
preferences.
4. Big Money Distorts Deliberation
What big money buys in debates on ballot measures is media exposure.
According to several studies, media exposure is the single most important
factor influencing and swaying voter decisions.100 Given the cost of the
media, for the most part, the public will be asked to make critical public
policy decisions based upon fifteen second sound bites financed by interests
that have the most money to spend on the media. Clearly our constitutional
framers, and the original supporters of initiative and referendum, did not
envision policy making premised upon sound bites and the cash nexus, yet
the evidence, as Cronin and Gerber indicate, suggests that this is exactly
what has happened in various states. Moreover, consider the structural
differences between legislative deliberations and ballot initiatives.

96. CRONIN, supra note 75, at 109.
97. Id. at 110-13.
98. Id. at 142-43.
99. Id.
100. CRONIN, supra note 75, at 116-23.
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Legislators are able to compromise, bargain, negotiate, and can find ways to
take potentially incompatible propositions in legislation and make them
work together. Voters are given ballot initiatives as all-or-nothing
propositions, and cannot vote for part of it.101 Ballot propositions generally
must adhere to a single subject,102 yielding problems of compromise.
Additionally, voters may be asked to vote on contradictory propositions103
again without the ability of legislators to forge compromises or affect
tradeoffs to render them compatible. Thus, the deliberative nature of
representation that Madison and the constitutional framers desired may
often be missing in ballot initiatives. The result is the creation of faulty
legislation that too may fail to adequately capture public sentiment on any
of the propositions they are asked to render decisions upon.
5. Initiative and Referendum Has Little Impact On Breaking Up
Special Interests
Advocates of initiative and referendum claimed that letting the voters
decide would help break the hold that special interests had upon
legislatures. It would do that in part by mobilizing citizens to outvote
citizens. Only part of this Progressive hope has been realized. While some
contend that ballot initiatives do not increase voter turnout,104 more recent
evidence contradicts that and finds that their placement does, in fact,
mobilize more to participate.105 However, research also indicates that
interest groups have become effective in using direct democracy to further
their causes, thus questioning a central tenet of initiative and referendum
advocates—that their use breaks entrenched interests.106

101. See Chris Chambers Goodman, (M)ad Men: Using Persuasion Factors in Media
Advertisements to Prevent a “Tyranny of the Majority” on Ballot Propositions, 32 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 247, 249 (2010).
102. See generally Daniel H. Lowenstein, California Initiatives and the Single-Subject Rule,
30 UCLA L. REV. 936 (1983); Daniel H. Lowenstein, Initiatives and the New Single Subject
Rule, 1 ELECTION. L. J, 35 (2002); John G. Matsusaka & Richard L. Hasen, Aggressive
Enforcement of the Single Subject Rule, 9 ELECTION L. J., 399 (2010) (discussing the singlesubject rule).
103. Michael D. Gilbert & Joshua M. Levine, Less Can Be More: Conflicting Ballot
Proposals and the Highest Vote Rule, 38 J. LEGAL STUD., 383, 394 (2009).
104. CRONIN, supra note 75, at 226-27.
105. Daniel A. Smith & Caroline Tolbert, The Instrumental and Educative Effects of Ballot
Measures: Research on Direct Democracy in the American States, 7 ST. POL. & POL’Y Q. 416,
430-31 (2007).
106. Id. at 432.
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6. Courts Do Not Always Defer to Ballot Measures
Another way in which the spirit of populism is frustrated by initiative
and referendum is in the lack of deference the courts often have towards
ballot measures.107 In general, courts will defer to the will of legislatures so
long as there is a rational basis to the policy adopted and there is some
legislative finding of fact to support the policy. However, in the case of
ballot measures, there is often very little, if any, finding of fact or
legislative hearings to support the initiative or referendum.108 Therefore, the
courts are unwilling to afford the same deference to initiative and
referendum as they would to acts of a state legislature.109 Thus, any
expression of populism that appears to occur as a result of ballot measures
disappears once they face judicial review and challenges.
7. Summary
Overall, there is good evidence that ballot initiatives, such as those
found in North Dakota, can often target or threaten individual and minority
rights. They may undermine the basic protection of rights that the
Constitution and the Bill of Rights are supposed to afford.Moreover, their
use provides for unrestricted use of money to affect political influence.
Thus, one can make the argument that the use of initiative and referendum
highlights—or shares—many of the problems found with it use across the
country.
IV. MONEY AND POLITICS
What role should private money have in the financing of elections in
the United States? No one is going to deny that elections are expensive.
Media time is costly as are “get out the vote” campaigns, voter
registrations, and a host of other activities that demand significant
resources.110 Some will argue that we expend too little on elections already,
107. See Cody Hoesly, Reforming Direct Democracy: Lessons from Oregon, 93 CAL. L.
REV. 1191, 1234-35 (2005) (noting the decreased deference state courts were giving in Oregon to
ballot measures); see also Michael D. Gilbert, Does Law Matter? Theory and Evidence from
Single Subject Adjudication, 40 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 338-40 (2011).
108. See generally Mihui Pak, The Counter-Majoritarian Difficulty in Focus: Judicial
Review of Initiatives, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 237, 249-50 (1999) (discussing the problems
regarding standards of review the courts should take toward ballot initiatives).
109. CRONIN, supra note 75, at 219-20. See also MATHEW MANWELLER, THE PEOPLE VS.
THE COURTS: JUDICIAL REVIEW AND DIRECT DEMOCRACY IN THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 8,
218 (2005) (finding that the courts treat ballot initiatives differently from ordinary legislation and
that they are less likely to defer to and uphold the former compared to the latter); KENNETH
MILLER, DIRECT DEMOCRACY AND THE COURTS 89-90, 91-94, 122, 219 (2009).
110. In 2012, the average cost of winning a U.S. Senate race was approximately $10,351,556
and $1,596,953 in the U.S. House of Representatives. Vital Statistics on Congress, BROOKINGS
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especially when compared to how much as a society we spend on our pets
for example.111 Others might assert that money needs to be raised and
spent, especially by challengers, to offset incumbent advantages.112 These
and other points are well taken, but they fundamentally miss the mark.
The question is not necessarily how much we spend on elections, but
instead on whether the current system of financing elections is incompatible
with the values of American democracy. Should money influence political
choices and outcomes? Can we reconcile American democracy with free
market capitalism in a way that allows the conversion of economic
resources into political influence? This is really the basic cluster of
questions that neither Congress, state legislatures, nor the Supreme Court
have addressed. Nor is this a question that most election law scholars seem
to be asking. They have failed to get to the deeper question of looking at
whether the theories or democratic values that give meaning to the
Constitution, and which should give definition to election law, are
supported or undermined by the economic values that seem to be at the
basis of how the United States currently finances its political process.
Asking this question is no different than raising other, more
fundamental, questions about values and institutions in American society.
For example, some would assert that the way health care is allocated in the
United States is fundamentally at odds with the way it should be allocated.
By that, health care should be allocated on the basis of medical need or
illness, not the ability to pay.113 Yet, the United States is a pay-for-access
and a profit-based system denying millions access to health care. It is a
system more costly, with lower access, and less equitable outcomes overall
than many other health care delivery systems found elsewhere in the
world.114 Even with reforms found in the Affordable Care Act, many of
these problems may not be solved because the market system for delivering
INSTITUTE, available at http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/07/vital-statisticscongress-campaign-finance-mann-ornstein.
111. See, e.g., BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE
REFORM 42 (2003).
112. See, e.g., Gary C. Jacobson, The Effects of Campaign Spending on Congressional
Campaigns, 72 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 469 (1978), and THE POLITICS OF CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS (2004).
113. KIP SULLIVAN, THE HEALTH CARE MESS: HOW WE GOT INTO IT AND HOW WE’LL
GET OUT OF IT 85-86 (2006); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY (1984).
114. ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., OECD HEALTH DATA 2012: HOW DOES
available at
http://www.oecd.org/health/healthTHE UNITED STATES COMPARE,
systems/BriefingNoteUSA2012.pdf (site last visited on March 26, 2013); Atule Gawande, The
Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town Can Teach Us about Health Care, THE NEW YORKER,
available at http://www newyorker.com/reporting/2009/06/01/090601fa_fact_gawande (last
viewed on March 26, 2013).
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health care in the United States is incompatible with the basic values of
what a health care system is supposed to secure—affordable, quality health
care available for all who need it. The debate that does not take place in the
United States is whether the market is the correct or appropriate institution
to allocate health care. This is the question that needs to be asked about
political influence in the United States.
Is the economic market the correct way to allocate political power or
influence in the United States? Should dollars equate to political influence?
And if so, how does such a conversion affect American democratic values?
There are really two basic answers to this question. The first assents to the
legitimacy of money’s role in allocating political influence in American
politics. For the most part, this perspective would urge some form of
deregulation of money, arguing for a dismantling of all contribution limits
to go along with the current lack of expenditure limits. That position, at
least until recently, has been one of asserting no limits and full disclosure.
It is similar to the legal environment that currently exists in North
Dakota. Yet as we shall see, that position, once held by former FEC
commissioner Brad Smith and others, has now evolved and he, along with
James Bopp, and Justice Clarence Thomas, now even contest the legitimacy
of disclosure rules. These individuals seem ready to embrace the idea that
money is constitutionally protected speech. They seem to believe that there
is no problem in letting economic wealth and resources be converted over
into a factor allowing political power or influence in American politics.
They believe that such a use of money need not be disclosed and can be
done in a clandestine fashion. This is a position closer to where North
Dakota is today—unregulated money but limited disclosure. Yet a
competing perspective, partially held by former Justice Stevens, argues that
money is property, not speech, and as a result, contribution and expenditure
limits are constitutional.115 While Stevens may not have gone so far as to
assert that money should not be converted into political influence, there is a
broader argument that can build upon the “money is not speech” argument
to assert that American democratic theory needs to significantly confine the
ability to convert economic resources into political influence.
A. DEREGULATE BUT DISCLOSE
For the most part, Buckley established disclosure as part of what Bruce
Ackerman and Ian Ayres call the old paradigm for campaign finance
reform.116 They argue that the prevailing paradigm supporting disclosure
115. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov’t PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 398 (2000) (Stevens, J., concurring).
116. BRUCE ACKERMAN AND IAN AYRES, VOTING WITH DOLLARS 3 (2002).
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saw money in the political process as similar to pollution—it is best to limit
both and also restrict where either of them can be dumped.117 However,
they argue that the full disclosure or publicity route has proved to be
unsuccessful or otherwise plagued by constitutional infirmities,118 thereby
leading Ackerman and Ayres to reject disclosure and opt instead for what
they describe as a new paradigm for campaign finance reform that relies
upon market analogies.119 They called their proposal the “secret donation
booth.”120 Under this regime, contributions to candidates would be
anonymous,121 thereby eliminating the incentives to engage in quid pro quo
activity. While Ackerman and Ayres appear to be unique in rejecting
disclosure for anonymity, they are correct in their assertion that the
prevailing Buckley paradigm does support it.122
But, why “disclosure-only?” By disclosure-only, it is meant to allow
donors to contribute any amount they want to whomever they want, subject
only to the disclosure of the donation. The case for disclosure only can be
articulated on at least two grounds. First, such a regime is the best or most
acceptable way to regulate the role of money. Second, it is advocated in
lieu of other campaign finance mechanisms because other more extensive
regimes are unconstitutional or because disclosure is offered as a Trojan
horse in lieu of real regulation.
Generally, disclosure-only is advocated by its proponents because they
do not believe that other forms of regulation are constitutional. For
example, Martin Redish believes that money given in a political context is
protected speech and that the use of money for this purpose is a speech-act
deserving of constitutional protection.123 While Redish’s Money Talks is
silent on the issue of disclosure, presumably he would advocate it in some
circumstances, yet his solution to the corruption and unequal flow of money
in the political system would be to address the root problem of economic
inequalities that exist. Redistributive policies that alter economic power in
society are thus a preferred solution.124
Bradley Smith seemed at one time to be the most forceful advocate of
the disclosure-only regime. Smith’s support for the disclosure-only
position was grounded by three definitive reasons. First, money used for

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.

Id. at 3.
Id. at 4-5.
Id. at 18, 21 (praising reforms that embrace “market signals”).
Id. at 3.
Id. at 6.
Id. at 4, n.1-2 (discussing supporters of disclosure-only proposals).
Id. at 126.
Id. at 234.
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political purposes is protected speech.125 Second, most campaign finance
reform regulations are difficult to administer.126 Third, disclosure works.127
For Smith, he appears to accept the Buckley argument that the only
acceptable justification for the regulation of money in politics is to address
the problem of corruption or its appearance.128 Yet, unlike the Court which
endorsed contribution limits in Buckley, Smith sides with Chief Justice
Burger’s concurrence129 in that the least restrictive means to addressing
quid pro quo corruption is disclosure.130 Disclosure would thereby render
any other form of regulation unconstitutional because it is not narrowlytailored to secure this compelling interest.131 Moreover, Smith insists that
disclosure does work. For example, Smith cites the 1971 Federal Election
Campaign Act laws as an example of how disclosure brought to light the
Watergate abuses and the eventual resignation of Richard Nixon as
evidence that disclosure can root out corruption.132 Elsewhere, he argues
that disclosure can bring corruption and conflicts of interest to light.133
Overall, a disclosure-only regime seems capable of serving the compelling
government interests that the Buckley Court identified.
However, Smith’s endorsement of disclosure-only seems half-hearted
at best. For example, he appears to view it as a form of regulation that
could be too cumbersome and interfere with First Amendment rights.134
Second, he cites McIntyre v. Ohio135 to argue that there are limits on what
can be disclosed, suggesting that this case places some outer limits on
publicity in the name of protecting privacy.136 Third, he even suggests that
there may not be strong enough of a governmental justification to compel
disclosure and that it may in fact burden grassroots political activity.137

125. BRADLEY A. SMITH, UNFREE SPEECH: THE FOLLY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM
193 (2001).
126. Id. at 91.
127. Id. at 32.
128. Id. at 203-04.
129. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 235-56 (1976) (Burger, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
130. SMITH, supra note 125, at 130.
131. Id. at 135.
132. Id. at 32.
133. Id. at 175.
134. Id. at 91.
135. 514 U.S. 334 (1995)
136. SMITH, supra note 125, at 222. See also Richard L. Hasen, The Surprisingly Easy Case
for Disclosure of Contributions and Expenditures Funding Sham Advocacy, 3 ELEC. L. J. 251
(2004), for a discussion of the status of McIntyre v. Ohio in the face of the recent McConnell v.
Fed. Election Comm’n ruling upholding, with limited comment, various disclosure provisions in
BCRA.
137. SMITH, supra note 125, at 224-25.
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Fourth, Smith contends that bribery laws are already in place to address
corruption, thereby questioning the need for disclosure. Finally, Smith even
concedes that disclosure might not be able to address certain problems such
as issue advocacy.138 Overall, by the time one finishes reading Unfree
Speech, it is unclear whether Smith really supports disclosure as the ideal
form of regulation—whether he supports it because it works, whether he
thinks it is actually unconstitutional, or that he thinks it is the only form of
regulation that passes constitutional muster. Instead, disclosure appears to
be a bone thrown to advocates for more forceful reform, hoping that
endorsing it will be sufficient to deflect demands for other changes.
In addition to Smith, Kathleen Sullivan,139 Larry Sabato and Glenn
Simpson,140 and Todd Lochner and Bruce Cain141 also endorse disclosureonly as their preferred campaign finance reform solutions. For example,
Sabato and Simpson document the history of campaign finance reforms in
the United States, indicating that disclosure has been a preferred solution
dating back to 1907142 and that it was the central principle of the Federal
Election Campaign Act and the post-Watergate reforms.143 After an
exhaustive analysis of then recent money abuses in American politics,
Sabato and Simpson conclude that new reforms are needed. The regime
they call for is described by them as “deregulation plus.”144 Deregulation
plus is essentially a disclosure-only regime where all contribution limits
would be abolished,145 and where the fear of public backlash following
disclosure would serve as a deterrent to groups that do not disclose.146
In support of their deregulation plus regime, Sabato and Simpson draw
an analogy between spending on campaigns and elections to that of trading
in stocks on Wall Street:
Consider the American stock markets. Most government oversight
of them simply makes sure that publicly traded companies
accurately disclose vital information about their finances. The
138. Id. at 221.
139. See generally Kathleen M. Sullivan, Political Money and Freedom of Speech, 30 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 663 (1997).
140. See generally LARRY J. SABATO & GLENN R, SIMPSON, DIRTY LITTLE SECRETS: THE
PERSISTENCE OF CORRUPTION IN AMERICAN POLITICS (1996).
141. Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, The Enforcement Blues: Formal and Information
Sanctions for Campaign Finance Violations, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 629 (2000) [hereinafter Lochner
& Cain 2000]; Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of
Campaign Finance Laws, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1891 (1999) [hereinafter Lochner & Cain 1999].
142. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 140, at 11-12.
143. Id. at 32, 54.
144. Id. at 330.
145. Id. at 334.
146. Id. at 330.
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philosophy here is that buyers, given, the information they need,
are intelligent enough to look out for themselves. There will be
winners and losers, of course . . . but it is not the government’s
role to guarantee anyone’s success . . . The notion that people are
smart enough, and indeed have the duty, to think and choose for
themselves, also underlies our basic democratic government.
There is no reason why the same principle cannot be successfully
applied to a free market for campaign finance. In this scenario,
disclosure laws would be broadened and strengthened, and
penalties for failure to disclose would be ratcheted up, while rules
on other aspects—such as sources of funds and sizes of
contributions—could be greatly loosened or even abandoned
altogether.147
For Sabato and Simpson, a broadened disclosure regime is preferred
for several reasons. First, restrictions on spending implicate First
Amendment values.148 Second, public financing will not be able to address
the problems associated with spending by third party groups.149 Third, all
the current loopholes in the system have effectively created a system
Fourth, broadened
without any spending or contribution limits.150
disclosure would bring to light the activities of many groups presently
hidden.151 Fifth, as noted above, well-informed citizens can make their own
judgments regarding what they think the contributions and spending
patterns mean to them and therefore judge accordingly.152
Sabato and Simpson acknowledge two possible objections to their
deregulation plus regime. First, what if groups opt not to disclose? This is
where the fear of backlash comes in. That is, the remedy for groups seeking
to remain clandestine is that there would be a public backlash against them
or the candidates they support if they are caught.153 Second, Sabato and
Simpson worry that a broadened disclosure regime would bring too many
“politically active but politically inconsequential players into the federal
regulatory framework.”154 Their solution is to set a high disclosure
requirement of between $25,000 to $50,000 in total expenditures per

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
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Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 330.
Id.
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Id. at 332.
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election cycle.155 Below this threshold, there would not be a requirement to
disclose.
Kathleen Sullivan has also pressed the case for a disclosure-only
regime in a pair of articles. Sullivan contends that there are three types of
campaign finance reforms currently being advocated: (1) new limits on
political contributions, (2) public financing, and (3) restrictions on
expenditures.156 In part, her argument is that all three of these proposals
would run into a variety of constitution problems, but more importantly,
Sullivan attacks what she calls the political theory of campaign finance
reform by examining the “supposed seven deadly sins of political
money.”157 Sullivan argues that efforts to regulate these seven sins:
political inequality in voting, distortion, political inequality in
representation, carpet-bagging, diversion of legislative and executive
energies, quality of debate, and lack of debate,158 generally face
constitutional problems or that the sins alleged are “empirical problems”
that have not yet been adequately demonstrated or clarified to support the
restrictions imposed.159
In lieu of the three reform strategies noted above, Sullivan endorses
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion in Buckley160 and Justice Thomas’s views161
in Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. Federal Election
Commission162 that contributions and expenditures should be treated the
same and left unregulated.163 In its place, she asserts that political money
will not proliferate indefinitely, so long as “the identity of contributors is

155. Id.
156. Sullivan, supra note 139, at 667.
157. Id. at 671.
158. One can, however, also argue that Sullivan’s choice of the sins to be remedied by
campaign finance reform miss the real targets of reform. By that, ensuring that races are more
competitive, or that the challengers have adequate resources to mount effective races against
incumbents, are perhaps more crucial issues and concerns than the seven sins that Sullivan directs
her arguments against.
159. Sullivan, supra note 139, at 687.
160. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 235-56 (1976) (Burger, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
161. Sullivan, supra note 139, at 666; see also Sullivan’s Against Campaign Finance
Reform, infra note 166, at 313.
162. 518 U.S. 604, 638 (1996)
Whether an individual donates money to a candidate or group who will use it to
promote the candidate or whether the individual spends the money to promote the
candidate himself, the individual seeks to engage in political expression and to
associate with likeminded persons. A contribution is simply an indirect expenditure.
Id.
163. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Against Campaign Finance Reform, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 311,
313 (1998) [hereinafter Sullivan’s Against Campaign Finance Reform].
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Instead,
required to be vigorously and frequently disclosed.”164
deregulating contributions accompanied by increased disclosure will have
three salutatory effects. First, with more money in the system, the value of
any one contribution would decrease because politicians would have more
potential donors to seek out and therefore feel less indebted to any one
contributor. To paraphrase Sullivan’s language, with more quids in the
system, politicians have “less reason to commit to any particular quo.”165
Second, deregulating contributions would decrease the value of subterfuge
whereby groups presently resort to independent expenditures and soft
money contributions to parties.166 Finally, disclosure would subject
candidates to voter retaliation if exposed as taking too large of contributions
from some individuals or groups.167 Proof, for Sullivan, that voter
retaliation works can be found in the 1996 presidential race where
disclosure of Democratic fund-raising scandals had a temporary impact on
President Clinton’s poll numbers.168 Overall, Sullivan describes an
enforced disclosure regime as the preferred alternative to either a purely
laissez-faire or more extensively regulated system with contribution and
expenditure limits and public financing.
Todd Lochner and Bruce Cain also press the case for disclosure-only,
but do so as a result of their claims that other systems of campaign finance
regulation—such as contribution limits—faces numerous enforcement
problems. They base their claims both upon empirical studies of the
Federal Election Commission (“FEC”) and the California Fair Political
In examining the enforcement
Practices Commission (“FPPC”).169
practices of both, significant time delays in enforcement question whether
the use of formal sanctions by either deters illegal campaign practices.170
Similarly, they also question whether informal sanctions—the fear of public
exposure—will be a sufficient deterrent.171 This deterrence would work
only if voters take the time to research violations, and if the press
sufficiently and adequately covers the violations.172 While there is some
evidence that press coverage of illegal activity does have an impact upon

164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
at 1892.
170.
171.
172.

Sullivan, supra note 139, at 688.
Id. at 689-90.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Lochner & Cain 2000, supra note 141, at 630; Lochner & Cain 1999, supra note 141,
Lochner & Cain 2000, supra note 141, at 649.
Id. at 653-54.
Id.
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candidates, these studies overwhelmingly conclude that the deterrent value
is weak.173
Instead of contribution or other limits, Lochner and Cain argue that a
disclosure-only regime might be easier to enforce. These types of regimes
do not confront many of the difficult legal questions that other regulations
face.174 Thus, for Lochner and Cain, disclosure-only is opted for, even
though the authors do not endorse it as necessarily the best system for
regulating money in the political process.175 Like Sabato and Simpson, they
draw upon the market analogy and view politics as a free market.176
According to Lochner and Cain:
If politics is indeed a market, then let the market solve the
problem. Consider abolishing expenditure and contribution limits
and instead emphasize transparency based on immediate internet
disclosure. If voters actually care about where a candidate’s
money comes from, or how much money is spent, let them vote
based upon such distaste.177
Thus, despite their admonitions that voters do not spend much time
gathering information on candidates, and despite their criticism of the
deterrence model, in the end Lochner and Cain resort to both in defense of
their disclosure-only regime.
The chorus of support for deregulate-but-disclose does not stop here.
John Samples argues against campaign finance limits, contending that there
is little evidence that money corrupts the political process or that it affects
decisions on who runs or does not run for office.178 James Bopp, a frequent
litigator and critic of campaign finance reform laws that limit donations,
argued at one point in favor of donate but disclose179 before taking his
current position against even disclosure.180

173. Id. at 654.
174. Id. at 649.
175. Id.
176. Lochner & Cain 1999, supra note 141 at 1935.
177. Id.
178. See generally JOHN SAMPLES, THE FALLACY OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE REFORM (2006);
John Samples, Against Deference, 12 NEXUS 21, 23 (2007).
179. James Bopp, Jr., & Kaylan Lytle Phillips, The Limits of Citizens United v. Federal
Election Commission: Analytical and Practical Reasons Why the Sky Is Not Falling, 46 U.S.F. L.
REV. 281 (2012); James Bopp, Jr., & Joseph E. LaRue, The Game Changer: Citizens United’s
Impact on Campaign Finance Law in General and Corporate Political Speech in Particular, 9
FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 251 (2010-11).
180. James Bopp Jr. & Jared Haynie, The Tyranny of “Reform and Transparency”: A Plea
to the Supreme Court to Revisit and Overturn Citizens United’s “Disclaimer and Disclosure”
Holding, 16 NEXUS: CHAP. J. L. & POL’Y 3 (2010-11).
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Overall, in defending disclosure-only, several claims from its advocates
can be gleaned. First, disclosure-only regimes will more readily discourage
the proliferation of money than will other regimes. Second, disclosure-only
regimes will deter large contributions or contributors because of fear of
voter backlash. Third, disclosure-only regimes are better able to address the
problems associated with spending by third parties than other types of
regimes. Fourth, disclosure-only regimes will produce more money in the
political system, resulting in less quid pro quos. Fifth, disclosure-only
regimes will discourage subterfuge. Sixth, disclosure-only regimes will
equalize spending and competition. Seventh, disclosure-only regimes are
easier to enforce and implement.
B. DISCLOSURE IS NOT ENOUGH
There are three major problems with the disclosure-only arguments.
One is conceptual, the second empirical, and the third is a structural
democratic one.
Conceptually, the case for disclosure-only lacks
development or rests upon numerous faulty assumptions.
First, in arguing for disclosure-only, what is left unclear in many of its
advocates’ arguments is what it means to have disclosure and what it means
to say that it works.181 For example, what would have to be disclosed to
qualify as a disclosure-only regime? Would it be disclosure of all
contributions—including expenditures? With that said, what does it mean
to “disclose all contributions?” Is it contributions made down to one cent?
Is it contributions from individuals, corporations, unions, PACS, conduit
funds?182 Does it also include contributions to PACS? If so, what do we
wish to know? Is it simply dollar amounts or do we also wish to know
names, addresses, and employers? In the case of Sabato and Simpson, at
least they are clear in terms of exempting some groups and individuals from
disclosure if they fall below a certain threshold. However, while such a
threshold might minimize excessive regulatory entanglement, and perhaps
comply with the constitutional requirements of NAACP v. Alabama,183
181. See Richard Briffault, Updating Disclosure for the New Era of Independent Spending,
27 J.L. & POL. 683 (2012); Richard Briffault, Campaign Finance Disclosure 2.0, 9 ELECTION L.J.
273, 275 (2010); Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance
Disclosure Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557 (2012), for thoughtful discussions on
what disclosure actually means in the age of the Internet.
182. WIS. STAT. § 11.01(5m) (2003) (“‘Conduit’ means an individual who or an organization
which receives a contribution of money and transfers the contribution to another individual or
organization without exercising discretion as to the amount which is transferred and the individual
to whom or organization to which the transfer is made.”). WISC. STAT. § 11.06(11) mandates the
public disclosure and reporting of conduit funds.
183. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding that a state law requiring a private association to publicize
the names of its members violated the First Amendment right to freedom of association).
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Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York v. Village of Stratton,184
and McIntyre v. Ohio, Sabato and Simpson ignore an unintended effect of
their threshold—the fact that many small groups have huge impacts in local
federal races and there would be an incentive to proliferate lots of small
groups to avoid disclosure. Why would groups still wish to avoid
disclosure? If the identity of groups or contributors is a signal regarding
where a candidate stands on issues, such as in the case of candidates who
receive money from the National Rifle Association or from Emily’s List,
then many candidates or groups might wish to obscure the source of their
money.185
Moreover, Sabato and Simpson and Sullivan rely upon disclosure as a
deterrent effect, although the nature of the deterrence for them is very
different. For Sabato and Simpson, deterrence comes into play as a way to
encourage groups and individuals to disclose for fear of public backlash if
they do not, but are nonetheless caught.186 For Sullivan, deterrence comes
into play as a way to discourage candidates from taking too large of
contributions from big donors, less voter backlash.187 Now assuming in the
first case that groups can be detected if they try to hide from disclosing,
there are several problems with the voter backlash thesis. First, while both
Sabato/Simpson and Sullivan contend that deregulating contributions will
remove the disincentive for groups to give independently or seek
subterfuge, they—and especially Sullivan—also stipulate that fear of voter
backlash will discourage contributions. Does not this fear of backlash
create an incentive for subterfuge?
Yet, even if fear of backlash does not discourage clandestine activity,
there are real questions regarding the efficacy of deterrence. Within the
field of criminal justice, while deterrence is often articulated as a goal of
punishment, proof of its efficacy is questionable.188 A deterrence theory in
criminal justice assumes, among other things: (1) potential offenders who

184. 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
185. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (stating that knowledge of a candidate’s
contributions “allows voters to place each candidate in the political spectrum more precisely than
is often possible solely on the basis of party labels and campaign speeches” and that the “sources
of a candidate’s financial support also alert the voter to the interests to which a candidate is most
likely to be responsive and thus facilitate predictions of future performance in office.”).
186. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 140, at 334.
187. Sullivan, supra note 139, at 689.
188. See SAMUEL WALKER, SENSE AND NONSENSE ABOUT CRIME AND DRUGS, 100 (2001);
DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY
SOCIETY, 59-60 (2001); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, GORDON HAWKINS, & SAM KAMIN,
PUNISHMENT AND DEMOCRACY: THREE STRIKES AND YOUR-RE OUT IN CALIFORNIA, 94-5, 1035 (2001) (indicating that the California three strikes and you’re out policy rested upon the concept
of deterrence and that the evidence indicates that the three strikes laws did not deter).
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are aware of the punishment; (2) offenders weigh the punishment against
the benefit of committing the crime; (3) offenders believe that they will be
caught, and; (4) that the society-defined punishment is actually perceived as
punishment to the offenders.189 The same logic applies to the backlash
thesis advocated by both Sabato/Simpson and Sullivan in that one needs to
assume that voters are rational, paying attention to campaign contributions,
weighing contributions when making electoral choices, and that they will
punish candidates because they are taking contributions from donors whom
they do not approve. It is not clear that this model works in the real world.
Even Kathleen Sullivan seems to acknowledge that the backlash is of
limited value, noting that revelations of Democratic Party fundraising only
had a temporary impact on Clinton’s polling numbers and that he did win
the election. Clinton and the Democrats did the crime but did not have to
the do time because the backlash was muted. So much for deterrence.
There are other problems in defining what disclosure means among its
advocates. In terms of expenditures, does disclosure include real time
disclosure, or does it include a statement indicating the source of the
contributions? Moreover, if one is to have disclosure-only, how should it
occur? Should it be online or in paper form? Should it be updated daily,
weekly, or monthly? All of these are issues left unresolved or explained in
terms of constructing a disclosure-only policy.
Dennis Thompson also points out that a disclosure-only regime would
never be satisfactory because it would fail to reveal the tacit promises,
agreements, or understandings embedded in the very essence of political
contributions.190 Disclosure-only, more importantly, would fail to address
many of the critical problems that money creates in campaign and elections,
such as allowing for the personal conversion of wealth into political
influence. It would be, in many ways, a post-facto remedy at best. As
Bradley Smith’s Watergate example demonstrates, disclosure did not
prevent the Nixon fundraising abuses; it only caught them several years
later after the election had occurred.191 Disclosure-only is not prophylactic;
it is a post-abuse remedy, which often does little to punish the wrongdoer.
Disclosure-only also presupposes that citizens are informed, aware, and
capable of digesting and understanding campaign finance reform
information. This is certainly true in the Sabato and Simpson model where
they draw parallels between political campaigns and Wall Street, or
Lochner and Cain in describing elections to be like a marketplace. None of
189. WALKER, supra note 188, at 100.
190. DENNIS F. THOMPSON, JUST ELECTIONS: CREATING A FAIR ELECTORAL PROCESS IN
THE UNITED STATES 110 (2002).
191. See generally SMITH, supra note 125.
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these assumptions are likely to take place on a sufficient scale. Specifically,
the disclosure-only policy seems to assume rational, informed voters who
will seek out campaign finance information, weigh it in comparison to other
knowledge they have about candidates, and then express an informed
preference based upon all this. However, even Lochner and Cain
acknowledge this depiction of voters is unrealistic,192 and such a model of
behavior is unlikely to occur except among a few, with many instead
perhaps voting more out of concern regarding the economy, war and peace,
or other issues more salient.
As Elizabeth Garrett points out,193 disclosure has its limits. Voters
have limited time, knowledge, and expertise.194 They face many complex
choices. They do not act as the fully informed market participants that
Smith, Sullivan, and Sabato and Simpson envision. Instead, voters use a
variety of cues when making voting choices, such as who gives the
candidate money or the party of the candidate, and they also need
information packaged in a way that is digestible and useable to them if
disclosure-only is to work.195 Yet, none of the advocates of the disclosureonly regime have paid any attention to these issues. None of this is to say
to the source of political money is unimportant to voters. Instead, how
campaigns are financed is a process issue different from the content of
issues that people consider when making voting choices. Conflating the
two is a mistake, demonstrating a misunderstanding regarding between how
elections are run and the factors that influence electoral choice.
Sabato and Simpson’s analogy of comparing elections and voters to the
stock market and investors is inapt on several grounds.196 First, presumably
investors are more informed about financial matters than would be general
voters simply by the fact that investors might tend to be better educated
than many voters. Second, however, the recent Wall Street scandals
involving Enron, WorldCom, and a host of other companies demonstrate
that even investors are not well informed. There are many abuses in the
financial markets, some of which could be attributed to a lack of disclosure
(but also many of them sourced in illegal behavior that included lying and
possible abuse of market positions). If Sabato and Simpson’s call to make
192. Lochner & Cain 2000, supra note 141, at 648.
193. See generally Elizabeth Garrett, Voting with Cues, 37 U. RICH. L. REV 1011 (2003).
194. MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 271 (1996) (noting the lack of knowledge Americans have about
politics and specifically discussing how this lack of knowledge and expertise affects political
engagement and motivation).
195. Id. at 44-5 (discussing the use of cues among voters as surrogates for more substantive
political knowledge).
196. SABATO & SIMPSON, supra note 140, at 330.
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the Federal Election Commission act more like the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) in policing disclosure, the passage of SarbanesOxley197 and other Wall Street reforms demonstrate a demand for
strengthened regulatory behavior on the part of the SEC beyond simply
mandating more disclosure.
Third, Wall Street regulation has never been simply a disclosure-only
regime. The existence of antitrust laws and the enforcement activity by the
Federal Trade Commission, among other agencies, is proof that simple
disclosure of business practices is not enough to protect either investors or
consumers.198 Finally, unlike playing the stock market, which produces
private goods, voting has an external effect such that one person’s choice on
whom to vote for will have an impact on others in terms of what candidates
are elected. Put simply, there are numerous individual and collective
benefits attached to voting choices and the regulation of campaigns that
may distinguish the regulation of elections and voters from that of the stock
market and investors.
In making the case that disclosure-only is the best possible solution,
Sabato and Simpson state that it has been used since 1907—and especially
since Watergate—as a guiding principle to regulate money in politics.
Instead of viewing history as vindication of disclosure-only, the failure of it
to clean up campaigns and elections over the last 100 years should be proof
that more than disclosure-only is needed. Thus, disclosure-only fails for
lack of conceptual clarity, exaggerated conceptions of voter rationality, and
misplaced use of both the marketplace and deterrence analogies. Moreover,
as some have argued, from an empirical point of view, disclosure only
regimes failure to demonstrate any superiority in terms of discouraging the
proliferation of money, deterring large contributions or contributors because
of fear of voter backlash, addressing third party money, or discouraging
subterfuge. If the goal of donate-but-discourage, or allow for donations but
still discourage them through disclosure or other mechanisms, is to address
the goals of preventing corruption or its appearance or producing elections

197. Pub. Co. Accounting Reform and Investor Prot. Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 et seq (2002).
198. Drawing analogies of the political to the economic marketplace seem to be at odds with
several arguments to segment or bracket the two. See Fed. Election Comm’n v. Mass. Citizens for
Life, Inc. 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986) (stating that “[d]irect corporate spending on political activity
raises the prospect that resources amassed in the economic marketplace may be used to provide an
unfair advantage in the political marketplace.”). Id. at 268 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring and
dissenting in part) (stating that “I do not dispute that the threat from corporate political activity
will vary depending on the particular characteristics of a given corporation; it is obvious that large
and successful corporations with resources to fund a political war chest constitute a more potent
threat to the political process than less successful business corporations or nonprofit
corporations.”).

402

NORTH DAKOTA LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 89:371

less dependent upon money, then these types of regimes fail miserably to
live up to their promise.199
Yet the deregulate-yet-disclose or disclosure-only position once held
by many is either no longer their position or their original argument was
merely a Trojan Horse to contend against contribution limits until such time
as they could then dismantle them and then go after disclosure. Bradley
Smith now contends that many disclosure laws violate a right to privacy
and hurt public discourse.200 William McGeveran similarly worries about
disclosure and privacy rights.201 John Samples also opposes disclosure and
too finds that it hurts deliberation.202 Bopp sees in disclosure the handwork
of tyranny and tyrants.203 Bopp even argues that disclosure chills speech
and seems bent on offering evidence of this on the election law listserv and
elsewhere, although he does seem to support disclosure for candidate
contributions, for now.
Because public disclosure of a person’s political activity and/or
political viewpoints can lead to harassment and that, as a result,
lack of anonymity chills speech, the government needs a
compelling justification to require disclosure. I agree that one of
those instances where disclosure is justified is contributions to
candidates.204
Cleta Mitchell goes so far as to argue that disclosure is incompatible with
the First Amendment.205 Even Clarence Thomas, in Doe v. Reed seems
skeptical of disclosure laws because of concerns about harassment,206 and
privacy. Jim Bopp states his stance well: “[b]lacks, gays and leftist[s] were
harassed yesterday; conservatives and Christians are harassed today. And
no one is safe from the thugs and bullies tomorrow.”207 Bopp, Samples,
199. See generally David Schultz, Disclosure Is Not Enough: Empirical Lessons from State
Experiences, 4 ELECTION L.J. 349 (2005).
200. Bradley A. Smith, In Defense of Political Anonymity, CITY J., Winter 2010, at 74, 75,
78.
201. See generally William McGeveran, Mrs. McIntyre’s Persona: Bringing Privacy Theory
to Election Law, 19 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 859 (2011).
202. John Samples, The DISCLOSE Act, Deliberation, and the First Amendment, CATO INST.
(June 28, 2010), http:// www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa664.pdf.
203. See generally James Bopp, Jr. & Jared Haynie, The Tyranny of “Reform and
Transparency”: A Plea to the Supreme Court to Revisit and Overturn Citizens United’s
“Disclaimer and Disclosure” Holding, 16 NEXUS CHAP. J.L. & POL’Y 3 (2011).
204. Id.; see also James Bopp, Jr., Election Law Listserv, Jan. 19, 2013, available at
https://mail.google.com/mail/u/1/?shva=1#inbox/13c4aaf04af1be52 (site last viewed on Jan. 21,
2013) (on hand with the author) (hereinafter “Bopp Election Listserv”).
205. See generally Cleta Mitchell, Donor Disclosure: Undermining the First Amendment, 96
MINN. L. REV. 1755 (2012).
206. 561, U.S. 186, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2844-45 (2010) (Thomas, J. dissenting).
207. Bopp Election Listserv, supra note 204, at 565.
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and the others who first argued against contribution limits and now
disclosure, do so frankly because such policy positions seemingly hurt the
interests and parties they espouse.
Of course in some cases, privacy and anonymity may be in order. In
the case of NAACP v. Alabama,208 there was clear evidence of harassment
and intimidation that included “economic reprisal, loss of employment,
threat of physical coercion, and other manifestations of public hostility.209
This case also took place at a time when the civil rights movement was
growing, and lynching, cross burnings, and other acts of intimidation were
taking place across the south. There were also documented instances of
persecution cited by the Court in Brown v. Socialist Workers 1974
Campaign Committee.210 The evidence in both cases was enough for the
Court to reject attempts to force disclosure of membership and contributor
lists. Yet, as Hasen points out, there is scant evidence of donor intimidation
or harassment, despite the best efforts by some to find it or trump on
instances.211 Even Kathleen Sullivan, a supporter of disclosure only laws,
concedes that disclosure of donors does little to impede their activity. Part
of the problem is in defining harassment, intimidation, or chilling of speech.
As Smith and his co-authors ask in their election law book: are instances of
leaflets being torn, swearing, pushing over a table, and perhaps even some
pushing and shoving demonstrators or others atypical and evidence of
intimidation?212 Is being mooned a form of intimidation or chilling?213 It is
not so clear that these are such instances of that or that this is not what
should be expected in the world of politics. Politics is about passion and
advocacy, and to some extent, people should expect that articulating
positions will elicit responses. This, after all, is the purpose of advocating
positions and communicating in general–getting a response.
Moreover, there may be legitimate cases where disclosure does
compromise or hurt deliberations. Jury deliberations are private. But, a
general across the board argument for privacy or non-disclosure of
donations seems overly broad and contrary to the general democratic values
of transparency and public decision-making. In many cases, tyrants seek
disclosure, but the essence of oppression is secrecy and operating in the
shadow. There may be cases where donations up to a certain dollar amount
208. 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
209. Id. at 462.
210. 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
211. Richard L. Hasen, Chill Out: A Qualified Defense of Campaign Finance Disclosure
Laws in the Internet Age, 27 J.L. & POL. 557, 559 (2012).
212. See generally MICHAEL DIMINO, BRADLEY SMITH, AND MICHAEL SOLIMINE, VOTING
RIGHTS AND ELECTION LAW 667 (2010).
213. Doe v. Reed, 823 F. Supp. 2d 1195 (W.D. Wash. 2011).
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should be shielded from disclosure to protect people from job retaliation.
However, to argue that corporations, PACs, and large donors should be
protected from disclosure and prevent them from being chilled in their
speech is incorrect. Moreover, to assert that these entities are weak and
powerless, or discrete and insular and needing protection in the political
marketplace, is disingenuous at best. There are two arguments here, both
directed at addressing the structural democratic argument in favor of
disclosure and in terms of building up a wall that shields the polity from
being influenced by money and economic market factors.
First, Anthony Johnstone makes the case for disclosure in terms of
Madisonian democracy.214 He places the argument for disclosure in terms
of the Republican-concern to address corruption, as manifest in James
Madison’s arguments in Federalist Ten regarding the need to combat and
check factions.215 This is a conception of corruption that transcends the
simple notion of quid pro quo that dominates current justifications for
contribution limits and disclosure.216 The concern with factions is to root
out groups who wish to oppose the public interest or the rights of others—it
is an anti-democratic or anti-popular government motive. To a large extent,
the difference between a faction and any other group organizing is one of
purpose and intent—which includes licit and illicit intents. Disclosure
furthers what Johnstone calls an anti-factional interest.217 This is an interest
in ascertaining information about factions so that we know their purposes.
Exposing their purposes is critical to promoting a democratic government
because it is part of controlling the effects of factions.
Disclosure, though, does more. It may discourage illicit actions. Is
there anything unconstitutional in seeking to deter factions or groups from
engaging in activities that are impermissible? No. In general, the law seeks
to deter individuals and groups from engaging in anti-social and illegal
behavior. To say someone is chilled from committing a crime is
nonsensical. Similarly, to say that one is chilled from expending large sums
of money to buy or leverage political influence also is nonsensical and it
seems to presuppose that it is perfectly legitimate to leverage economic
resources to achieve this purpose.
This is the real crux of the issue. Smith, Samples, and Bopp all seem to
think it is legitimate to convert economic resources over into political
resources and therefore want to argue that money is speech, that limits on
214. See generally Anthony Johnstone, A Madisonian Case for Disclosure, 19 GEO. MASON
L. REV. 413 (2012).
215. Id. at 415, 438, 442.
216. Id. at 438.
217. Id. at 442.
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donations and expenditures are unconstitutional, and that efforts to regulate
money in politics and to promote disclosure is chilling protected freedoms.
In essence, the First Amendment enshrines capitalism. For the most part,
the Supreme Court seems to be willing to accept this assumption that
economic resources should convert over into political influence. This is the
core problem that the Supreme Court has failed to address.
C. DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: WHY MONEY NEEDS TO BE
LIMITED
The real question in the money and politics or “money is speech”
controversy is over the legitimate or permissible relationship between
democracy and capitalism. Historically many argue that there is an
interconnection between the rise of capitalism, religion, and democracy.218
Capitalism and democracy merged roughly at the same time in Europe
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Scholars asserted that the
concept of economic liberty and being free to act as the pejorative economic
man in the market place reinforced and gave impetus to the individual
liberty and the right to make choices in the political marketplace. Limited
government protected both economic and political liberty.
In his classic Capitalism and Freedom,219 Milton Friedman,
emphasized the connection between democracy and capitalism by
recognizing not only the historical connections between free markets and
individual freedom, but the current and critical interrelationship between the
two systems as well. When the gates of communism came crashing down
in the 1990s, many argued that a prerequisite to building democracy in
these former totalitarian states began with the privatization of state
enterprises and the establishment of market economies.220 To a large
extent, the evolutions of western capitalism and democracy have been
inextricably connected. To many, it is no coincidence that the American
218. See, e.g., MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM
(2010); ROGER H. TAWNEY, RELIGION AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM (2013); Göran Therborn,
The Rule of Capital and the Rise of Democracy, 103 NEW LEFT REV. 3 (May-June 1977); GEOFF
ELEY, FORGING DEMOCRACY: THE HISTORY OF THE LEFT IN EUROPE, 1850–2000 (2002).
Contra HANS BLUMENBERG, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE MODERN AGE (1985) (challenging the
Weberian thesis).
219. See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (2002).
220. See generally DANIEL YERGIN & DANIEL STANISLAW, THE COMMANDING HEIGHTS:
THE BATTLE FOR THE WORLD ECONOMY (2002); MANFRED STEGER, GLOBALISM: THE NEW
MARKET IDEOLOGY (2002); RAYMOND PLANT, THE NEO-LIBERAL STATE (2009); ANDERS
ÅSLUND, HOW CAPITALISM WAS BUILT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN
EUROPE, RUSSIA, AND CENTRAL ASIA (2007); ANDERS ÅSLUND, HOW UKRAINE BECAME A
MARKET ECONOMY AND DEMOCRACY (2009);
David Schultz, The Crisis of Public
Administration Theory in a Post-Global World, in THE STATE OF PUBLIC ADMIN.: ISSUES,
CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES, 453 (MENZEL & HARVEY eds., 2011).
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Declaration of Independence and Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations were
both penned in the same year. For Milton Friedman, F.A. Hayek,221 and
others, economic liberty and political liberty are reinforcing, and mutually
necessary, in creating democracy. In other cases, the argument is that
democracy requires a certain level of economic affluence and
development—even if such affluence and development is not rooted in
capitalism.222
There is, however, a contrary perspective that challenges the
connection between markets, political freedom and democracy. Capitalism
and democracy or free markets and limited government are not always
reinforcing but can be in tension if not in outright conflict.223 Chile, under
its president General Pinochet, was the epitome of free market capitalism
and totalitarianism. Similarly, China has perhaps one of the most
successful capitalist systems in the world right now under the direction of
an oppressive state with limited political freedom that gives lip service to
communism. In the United States, however, we supposedly have blended
the right combination of capitalism and democracy.
Additionally, there are a host of democratic theorists that contend that
capitalism and democracy are in conflict. Robert Dahl, for example,
describes this opposition as one where the political process is not
autonomous and instead is controlled or limited in its autonomy by
economic enterprises, market choices, and private investment decisions.224
C.B. MacPherson asserts that capitalism’s extractive capabilities undermine
the developmental capacities of some by transferring them from one to
221. See generally FRIEDRICH VON HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM (2007).
222. See generally GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY REVISITED, part II,
405-417 (1987); J. ROLAND PENNOCK, DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL THEORY 218-236 (1979);
ROBERT A DAHL, POLYARCHY: PARTICIPATION AND OPPOSITION (1971); ROBERT A. DAHL,
WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1971); ROBERT A. DAHL,
DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989); Samuel P. Huntington, Will More Countries become
Democratic? 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 193 (1984); Seymour M. Lipset, Some Social Requisites of
Democracy: Economic Development and Political Legitimacy, 53 AM. POL.SCI. REV. 69 (1959);
Martin C. Needler, Political Development and Socioeconomic Development: The Case of Latin
America, 62 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 62, 889 (1968); W.W. ROSTOW, THE STAGES OF ECONOMIC
GROWTH (1971); Dankwart A. Rustow, Modernization and Comparative Politics: Prospects in
Research and Theory,
1 COMP. POL. 37 (1968); PIPPA NORRIS, MAKING DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNANCE WORK: HOW REGIMES SHAPE PROSPERITY, WELFARE, AND PEACE 65 (2012), for
a review of the literature on the connection between levels of economic development and
democracy.
223. SAMUEL BOWLES & HERBERT GINTIS, DEMOCRACY AND CAPITALISM: PROPERTY,
COMMUNITY, AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF MODERN SOCIAL THOUGHT (1986); NORBERTO
BOBBIO, DEMOCRACY AND DICTATORSHIP (1989); C.B. MACPHERSON, THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
LIBERAL DEMOCRACY (2011); C.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN
RETRIEVAL (1973); CHARLES LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL
ECONOMIC SYSTEMS (1980) (discussing how markets and democracy often conflict).
224. ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS 324-332 (1989).
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another. In effect, capitalism undermines the ethical capacities of
individuals necessary to engage in democratic decision making by taking
away from some the economic means to act as an equal participant in the
polity.225 Carol Gould pushes this argument further by asserting that
economic inequalities and hierarchies undermine social cooperation and the
political balance between freedom and equality.226 Charles Lindblom
describes the market as a prison and corporate economic power as
incompatible with democratic self-governance.227 On the other hand, others
address the failure to address corporate power in America as a threat to
democracy.228 The fundamental problem here is that market or economic
logic has penetrated democratic theory and practice.229 The question is:
how is this so?
Culture is a totality as the philosopher Georg Hegel once stated.230
There is the marketplace or the economy, the government, and then civil
society. Daniel Bell, a famous sociologist, once wrote in the Cultural
Contradictions of Capitalism that these three components make up a
culture.231 Bell contended that the three also have their own logic and
values. The hallmark of Modernity is their separation.232 The political
theorist Michael Walzer argued that the emergence of contemporary free
societies resided in how the unity of totalitarianism is broken up by the
walls of pluralism.233 We maintain freedom in our society by walling off
issues—we separate the public from the private and the secular from the
parochial for example—in order to promote freedom. We define limits to
how far the government can go by creating constitutions and a bill of rights.
We limit the abuses of the marketplace with government regulation, and the
power of society to intrude upon privacy is maintained by marking
distinctions between private morality and public neutrality and by declaring

225. C.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ESSAYS IN RETRIEVAL 12-14 (1977).
226. CAROL C. GOULD, RETHINKING DEMOCRACY: FREEDOM AND SOCIAL COOPERATION
IN POLITICS, ECONOMY, AND SOCIETY (1988).
227. CHARLES LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S POLITICAL-ECONOMIC
SYSTEMS 356 (1980); Charles E. Lindblom, The Market as Prison, 44 J. POL., 324 (1982).
228. Jane Mansbridge, On the Importance of Getting Things Done, POL. SCI. Q., 1 (January,
2012); Robert A. Dahl, On Removing Certain Impediments to Democracy in the United States,
92 POL. SCI. Q., 1 (1977); ROBERT A. DAHL, DEMOCRACY AND ITS CRITICS (1989).
229. C.B. MACPHERSON, THE RISE AND FALL OF ECONOMIC JUSTICE AND OTHER ESSAYS
101-120 (1987).
230. See generally G.W.F. HEGEL, PHENOMENOLOGY OF SPIRIT (1977) (discussing in
paragraphs 484-595 the ways the spirit of an era encompasses the entire culture of a country).
231. See generally DANIEL BELL, THE CULTURAL CONTRADICTIONS OF CAPITALISM (1996).
232. Id.
233. MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY
312-324 (1984).
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that the government should not promulgate personal ethics or religious
values. Freedom in modern society is maintained by maintaining walls.
The danger, though, is when boundaries are crossed, such as when the
market intrudes upon how we value human life, when government invades
personal rights, or when private morality dictates how others should live. A
society without walls of separation runs the danger of turning oppressive.
Think about how governments and markets interact in at least four ways.
First, they represent the two dominate ways to distribute goods and
services.234 Except in the case of face-to-face barter economies, free market
and government distribution of goods and services provide rival ways to
coordinate their production and distribution.235 They do that either by
decentralizing and privatizing these decisions, in the case of market
mechanisms, or centralizing them, as with planned economies. Often these
decisions are not dichotomized; in most societies, there is a continuum or
hybrid of market-government and decentralized-centralized mechanisms
that operate.
Second, public power is necessary to create free markets. Polanyi
argued that free markets are not architectonic.236 They did not just arise and
develop on their own.237 The establishment of these free markets,
especially during the nineteenth century in Europe, was the product of
significant uses of governmental authority and power in order to enforce the
rules of free markets. Even Milton Friedman, a conservative free market
economist from the United States who was best noted for his arguments in
favor of privatization and minimal governmental intervention into the
economy, conceded that public authority to enforce the basic rules of the
market place.238 Max Weber’s writings on bureaucratic behavior are often
read as lessons for organizational theory.239 It is, however, important to
remember that Weber discussed bureaucracy and authority within the
context of capitalism and the role of the former in helping to sustain it. 240
More specifically, Weber insisted that modern bureaucracies and economic
orders, specifically capitalism, are interconnected.241

234. CHARLES LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD’S ECONOMIC SYSTEMS 410 (1977).
235. Id.
236. See generally KARL POLANYI, THE GREAT TRANSFORMATION (2001).
237. Id.
238. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 25-7 (2002).
239. Max Weber, Bureaucracy in HAN GERTH & C. WRIGHT MILLS, FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196 (1979).
240. LEWIS COSER, MASTERS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THOUGHT: IDEAS IN HISTORICAL AND
SOCIAL CONTEXT 230-33 (1977).
241. Id.
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Third, governmental authority is required to address and regulate
market failures, such as free rider problems, (negative) externalities,
information asymmetries, and monopolies.242 For many economists,
unregulated free markets produce problems that only government regulation
can correct. These may be problems surrounding maintenance of
demand,243 distributional issues, or other pathologies that impede efficiency
or the ability of markets to react to disequilibrium.244
Fourth, government intervention may be necessary to provide public
infrastructure investment or insure profitability of private businesses.245
While Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations is best remembered as the first
statement defending free markets and capitalism, the book also offers an
important defense for government investment in basic infrastructure, like
roads and canals in Smith’s day and schools and telecommunications today,
in order to sustain and support private investment.246 Moreover, James
O’Connor has argued that modern capitalist states serve two basic
functions—promote legitimization or support for the regime and undertake
activities that make it possible for private businesses to maintain
profitability or maintain capital accumulation.247
The general point here is that markets may be great mechanisms to
allocate sail boats and luxury items but not political influence and
democratic values. Allocation of political power and influence should be
distributed according to non-market criteria. As Daniel Bell pointed out,
market logic and concepts were increasingly coming to encroach or infringe
upon other parts of American culture including, for our purposes here, the
polity or political process.248 Others, such as Michael Sandel, have argued
that the danger now is the fact that the United States is turning from a
market economy to a market society where increasing all types of social
intercourse are being reduced to a cash nexus.249 Robert Kuttner makes a

242. JOHN CASSIDY, HOW MARKETS FAIL: THE LOGIC OF ECONOMIC CALAMITIES (2009).
243. JOHN MAYNARD KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST AND
MONEY (1964).
244. See generally ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF
(1975).
245. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE
WEALTH OF NATIONS (1937).
246. Id. at 452-58.
247. JAMES O’CONNOR, THE FISCAL CRISIS OF THE STATE 3-5 (2001).
248. BELL, supra note 231, at 430-33.
249. See generally MICHAEL SANDEL, WHAT MONEY CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF
MARKETS (2012).
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similar point.250 To a large extent, American political power is constantly
subjected to a marketization of its operations.
The issue here is not one of efficacy or money. It is not whether
money makes a difference in terms of who is elected or who has political
influence. One could debate forever whether money buys influence, but
there is significant evidence that economic inequalities have political
consequences.251 Specifically, political influence is associated with
affluence and the American policy process seems skewed to favor class
preferences, especially when one examines the relationship between class
and political engagement.252 Schattschneider contends that the mobilization
of bias in the American political process has produced a political system
Stated otherwise, when the policy
favoring the more affluent.253
preferences of the more affluent are different from the lower and middle
classes, the former generally have their preferences reflected in policy
outcomes.254 The issue instead is one about justice and fairness. It is about
whether money is the appropriate criteria to use to determine who has
political influence or authority. It is about setting boundaries, as Walzer
would argue,255 demarcating distinctions between the market economy and
the political system. While the field of political economy may be a
legitimate academic discipline, the American political system is not a
market democracy—the economic market place and the political forum or
agora should be distinct. The allocative criterion for a political democracy
is not the same as that for market capitalism. This is what the Bradley
Smiths, John Samples, and James Bopps fail to appreciate.
Even though American democracy has grown along with capitalism,
the two should not be conflated. For one, classical republican theory which
tremendously influenced the American political founding and founders is
characterized by fear of corruption that comes from, in part, a concern about
unequal distributions of property and wealth.256 Classical republican

250. See generally ROBERT KUTTNER, EVERYTHING FOR SALE: THE VIRTUES AND LIMITS
OF MARKETS (1999).
251. LAWRENCE JACOBS & DESMOND KING, THE UNSUSTAINABLE AMERICAN STATES
(2009);
DESMOND KING, ET AL, DEMOCRATIZATION IN AMERICA: A COMPARATIVEHISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2009); AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N, AMERICAN DEMOCRACY IN AN AGE OF
RISING INEQUALITY (Washington, D.C., Am. Pol. Sci. Ass’n, 2004).
252. See generally WARREN E. MILLER & J. MERRILL SHANKS, THE NEW AMERICAN
VOTER (1996); MICHAEL S. LEWIS-BECK, ET AL., THE AMERICAN VOTER REVISITED (2008).
253. E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMI-SOVEREIGN PEOPLE 20-47 (1960).
254. MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND
POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA (2012).
255. Michael Walzer, Liberalism and the Art of Separation, 12 POL. THEORY, 318 (1984).
256. See generally J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (2003).
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theorists, such as James Harrington, drew a connection between political
power and wealth or property, seeking in such divisions threats to a
republican form of government.257 James Madison too, in Federalist Ten,
described the “most common and durable source of factions has been the
various and unequal distribution of property.”258 Harrington, republican
theorists in general, and James Madison would have endorsed the idea that
somehow a wall must be fashioned that prevents the effects of wealth, as a
faction, from adversely affecting the political process. Thus, for those
originalists looking to a theory of democracy to support a jurisprudence that
sustains limits on the use of money for political purposes, there is good
evidence that a founding set of American values would sustain that
attempt.259
Additionally, one can occasionally point to some dicta in Supreme
Court decisions suggesting a broader understanding regarding a democratic
theory of election law that would wall off impermissible uses of money in
the political process. For example, Justice White, dissenting in First
National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,260 declared that it was reasonable to be
concerned about the use of concentrated wealth in politics.
States have provided corporations with such attributes in order to
increase their economic viability and thus strengthen the economy
generally. It has long been recognized however, that the special
status of corporations has placed them in a position to control vast
amounts of economic power which may, if not regulated, dominate
not only the economy but also the very heart of our democracy, the
electoral process. Although Buckley v. Valeo provides support for
the position that the desire to equalize the financial resources
available to candidates does not justify the limitation upon the
expression of support which a restriction upon individual
contributions entails, the interest of Massachusetts and the many
other States which have restricted corporate political activity is
quite different . . . . It is not one of equalizing the resources of

257. See generally PHILLIP PETTIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND
GOVERNMENT (1999); J.G.A. POCOCK, VIRTUE, COMMERCE, AND HISTORY: ESSAYS ON
POLITICAL THOUGHT AND HISTORY, CHIEFLY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (1985).
258. HAMILTON, MADISON, & JAY, THE FEDERALIST 44 (GEORGE W. CAREY & JAMES
MCCLELLAN eds., 1990).
259. Conversely, for advocates of pluralist democracy, they seemed largely inatentative to
the role that unequal resources played in terms of group strength, mobilization, and political bias.
This is largely the critique of the pluralist project. See, e.g., E.E. SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE 20-47 (1960); THEODORE J. LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM (1969); GRANT
MCCONNELL, PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (1966).
260. 435 U.S. 765, 809 (1978).
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opposing candidates or opposing positions, but rather of
preventing institutions which have been permitted to amass wealth
as a result of special advantages extended by the State for certain
economic purposes from using that wealth to acquire an unfair
advantage in the political process, especially where, as here, the
issue involved has no material connection with the business of the
corporation.261
In addition to Justice White acknowledging as legitimate the need to
draw boundaries between the economic and political spheres, Justice
Rehnquist, in the same case, hits a similar theme in stating that “[i]t might
reasonably be concluded that those properties, so beneficial in the economic
sphere, pose special dangers in the political sphere.”262 Finally, the
majority opinion in Federal Election Commission v. National Right to Work
Committee,263 perhaps articulated it the best when it quoted the government
defending a federal campaign finance law that its purpose was “to ensure
that substantial aggregations of wealth amassed by the special advantages
which go with the corporate form of organization should not be converted
into political ‘war chests’ which could be used to incur political debts from
legislators who are aided by the contributions.”264
What these comments from the Supreme Court suggest is recognition
that money used for political purposes needs to be limited. Politics in
general, and campaigns and elections in particular, may be expensive, but as
noted earlier, that it a different assertion from the one being made here.
Money may be necessary to run campaigns and elections, but their costs or
funding sources should not undermine democratic values. According to
Dahl, the problem of Buckley v. Valeo is that the Justices failed to
understand how a democratic system derives its legitimacy from political
equality.265 Allowing the allocative criteria of the economy to substitute for
equality in the political arena gives money and wealth a role that it just
should not have in American democracy.
The United States Constitution, as Justice Holmes is repeatedly quoted
from Lochner v. New York, does not embody a specific economic theory.266
The same can be said about American democracy. The democratic theory
at the foundation of American election law which should guide the
jurisprudence in this area should treat seriously the notion that a wall of
261.
262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

Id. at 809 (White, J., dissenting).
Id. at 826.
459 U.S. 197, 207 (1982).
Id. at 207.
ROBERT A. DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE CONSTITUTION 152 (2003).
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905).
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separation needs to be erected between the economy and the polity that is
no less high than the one between church and state. Neutrality, at least in
the political realm, demands distinct values and criteria separating it from
the economy. This implies that the use of money to affect political
decisions is an illicit or illegitimate purpose that ought to be chilled, and
seeking to prevent that conversion from occurring is a compelling
governmental interest that should be enough to substantiate the conclusion
that money is not speech.
V. CONCLUSION
North Dakota is an example of two of the major problems in
contemporary American election law. The first is that it allows for the use
of ballot initiatives to make policy, and the second is that it endorses the
unregulated use of money to influence campaigns and elections, In terms of
the problems associated with the former, the result has been to allow for
initiative and referendum to target personal freedoms. Majority rule is thus
being used in ways to undermine minority rights that James Madison and
perhaps other constitutional framers feared. In the second case, North
Dakota allows for the conversion of personal and corporate wealth into
political influence. This, perhaps, results in the state receiving an overall
failing grade when it comes to political corruption, and perhaps its
domination by powerful special interests.
The use of initiative and referendum, and the failure to regulate the role
of money in politics, are not the only problems facing this state. North
Dakota’s generally laissez-faire approach to disclosure of any kind, minimal
regulation of lobbyists, and its endorsement of close working relationships
between public officials and interest groups belie a state that likes to bask in
a populist image. Instead, such a regulatory environment does not yield
democracy but instead can produce the corruption that defines North
Dakota’s political environment.
So what is to be done? Are there easy or simple fixes for the state, of
for that matter, for other jurisdictions across the country facing similar
problems? One could perhaps suggest political contribution limits to
candidates and political organizations that come with better and more rapid
disclosure. One could also suggest better lobbyist disclosure with limits on
gifts. One might also advocate for better conflict of interest laws for public
officials and even for sharp limits on the use of ballot initiatives when it
comes to individual rights. All of these proposals could go a long way
toward improving the state of democracy in North Dakota, and in the
United States.

